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The insurance industry in Brazil: a long-term view  
  
Brazilian economic history from the 1860s was dominated by balance of payments 
shocks and spiraling inflation. Wide fluctuations in commodity prices, in the supply of 
foreign capital and also in the ability to attract foreign capital led to recurrent fiscal 
shocks, high inflation and foreign exchange depreciation. In spite of a better growth 
performance between 1900 and 1980 than in the first eighty years of independence 
(1822-1900), volatility of the exchange rate and domestic inflation increased 
significantly. After 1980, growth performance deteriorated sharply, with GDP per capita 
growing under 0.5% yearly for a quarter of a century. A unit of domestic currency at the 
time of independence in 1822 was equivalent to 2.75*10
15 units of domestic currency in 
1994 when yearly inflation was finally brought under control. 
 
 There was always room for public policies that tended to have significant distributive 
impact favoring selected groups of the population. An important example was coffee 
“valorisation” policies adopted early in the 20
th century with the intention of enhancing 
world prices through stockpiling. But other such policies became the rule after the 1928-
1932 great depression: high protection, quantitative import measures and foreign 
exchange controls, as well as discriminatory regulatory legislation that significantly 
affected the volume and distribution of foreign investment. Much of this chapter is on 
such fluctuations and their impact on the attractiveness of the Brazilian market for 
foreign capital, direct and otherwise, with emphasis on insurance and reinsurance 
companies, among other financial institutions. The focus on economic influences is due 
to the absence of major natural catastrophes that could have otherwise caused significant 
impacts on the insurance market. 
 
1. Early development: 1808-1900  
 
The history of insurance companies in Brazil starts in 1808 when two insurance 
companies were founded in the province of Bahia: Companhia de Seguros Boa Fé and 
Companhia de Seguros Conceito Público. However, the development of this business 3 
 
would be very slow, due to the lack of economic opportunities and political instability. 
The institutional framework was very lax and not adapted to the specificities of the 
country as early legislation on insurance was borrowed from Portugal. 
 
In 1822, Brazil became independent from Portugal and the Brazilian Empire was 
established by the son of the Portuguese king. After a period of political instability and 
regional rebellions his son succeeded to the throne in 1841 and was to remain 48 years in 
power, a period during which Brazil would experience significant social and economic 
transformations. 
 
Before the 1850s, there was very little development of the insurance business in Brazil. 
Information on insurance firms for this period is at best patchy. From 1822 to 1860, 
eighteen companies were granted authorisation to open businesses in Brazil
4 but it is not 
known if they were ever organized or how long they lasted. From their names they all 
seemed to have had Brazilian (or Portuguese) capital.
5 These companies operated mostly 
in maritime insurance (8 out of 18), but there were other insurance branches being 
developed early on, such as: life insurance (1 company), slave insurance (2 companies), 
mutual insurance (1 company) and fire insurance (3 companies)
6. The country was 
politically unstable and commercial activities did not seem very promising. However, by 
the 1850s, prospects had changed. In 1845, the last secessionist revolt had been 
controlled and, thanks to protectionist legislation, incipient factories started to emerge 
which were further fostered by funds released by the end of the transatlantic slave trade 
in 1850. The country was also experiencing an economic boom as coffee exports 
expanded. The development of railways increased the economic potential of the coffee 
                                                           
4 Brasil (1947). However, Saes and Gambi (2009, Graph 1, p. 3) found that 17 insurance 
companies were granted authorization to open business in Brazil from 1822 to 1850. 
5 Foreign companies were not unofficially regulated until the 1860s and officially until 
the 1890s/1900s. There is no evidence that foreign companies operated in Brazil before 
the 1860s though, but as a result of poor regulation, if foreign insurance companies ever 
operated in Brazil before that date, it is possible that we may just not find information on 
their businesses from official documents in Brazil. See further below in text for details on 
how regulation on insurance developed in Brazil. 
6 From the remaining companies, it was not possible to know in exactly which branches 
of insurance they operated. See Brasil (1947). 4 
 
region by linking them with the ports of Santos and Rio de Janeiro, and thence to the 
consuming markets. 
 
Amidst this positive economic and political outlook, the first commercial code was issued 
establishing, for the first time, specific regulations on maritime insurance.
7 The new 
legislation defined maritime insurance
8, terms of the contract
9, evaluation of insured 
assets
10 as well as reinsurance.
11 Even though the commercial code did not explicitly 
regulate other forms of insurance, its rules were used in the development of fire and life 
insurance businesses as well. Moreover, the commercial code was also important for 
defining the operation of joint-stock companies in Brazil that henceforth had to be 
registered in trade courts. The definition of rights and guarantees for stockholders 
allowed the expansion of joint-stock companies in general and of insurance companies in 
particular. 
 
Ten years later, the first steps towards supervision were taken through new legislation.
12 
Banks and joint-stock companies were to submit their accounts to regulatory authorities. 
A deadline for all existing joint-stock companies to obtain a charter from the government 
was defined. Rules on the creation and organisation of joint-stock companies were 
detailed. However, this regulatory framework is likely to have had little impact on 
insurance companies businesses. It targeted mostly banks as it was a response to the 1857 
banking crisis and thus ought to be analyzed in the context of the ensuing wave of 
orthodox monetarism in the 1860s. 
 
                                                           
7 Law 556 of June 25, 1850. Código Commercial 1850, Titles VIII to XIII (Second Part – 
‘On Maritime Commerce’). 
8 Código Commercial 1850, Title VIII, chapter I. 
9 Código Commercial 1850, Title VIII, chapter II. 
10 Código Commercial 1850, Title VIII, chapter III. 
11 Código Commercial 1850, Title VIII, chapter II, article 687. 
12 Decretos 2679, 2686 and 2711. See Brasil. Ministério da Fazenda. Ministro José Maria 
da Silva Paranhos, Proposta e Relatório do Anno de 1860 Apresentados à Assembléia 
Geral Legislativa na 1ª Sessão da 11ª Legislatura (inclui Annexos) 1861. 
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During the Empire, the banking sector suffered successive crises generally associated 
with periods of illiquidity. These periods of illiquidity were, in turn, a consequence of the 
centralized nature of the banking sector at the capital, Rio de Janeiro, and the seasonality 
involved in the production of commodities such as coffee. Together, these two factors 
meant that at specific periods of the year, money was drained from the capital to the 
interior to meet the planters’ financial obligations.  
 
Such was the case in 1864, when the banking sector was severely hit. On top of inherent 
problems and inadequacies of the financial system, private banks lent money to the 
agricultural sector against dubious collateral, while maintaining large current accounts 
that could be drawn at any moment. These unstable portfolios bypassed the legal 
restrictions imposed in 1860 on corporations.
13 The government responded by imposing 
new regulations on these private banks and also on the insurance business by extending 
supervision over mutual insurance companies, which had been hitherto unregulated.
14  
 
This regulatory framework was thus constantly evolving. As can be seen, regulatory 
changes usually occurred as a response to crises, especially in the banking sector. Indeed, 
the insurance sector was initially regarded as an appendix of the banking system and little 
specific attention was paid to it. Until 1872, there was no mention to the functioning or 
operation of insurance companies in the annual reports of the Ministry of Finance 
(Ministério da Fazenda). In 1871-72, for the first time, the report mentioned income 
generated from taxation on industries and professions broken down by sectors, 
discriminating the insurance sector separately. It was the first time the insurance sector 
deserved a separate focus. According to the data provided, six Brazilian insurance 
companies paid about US$255,000.
15 No mention was made to foreign insurance 
companies in Brazil, which remained pretty much unregulated (or at best unnoticed) until 
                                                           
13 Villela (1999). 
14 Decree 3189. See Instituto de Resseguros do Brasil (1942), 31-32. 
15 Brasil. Ministério da Fazenda. Ministro José Maria da Silva Paranhos, Proposta e 
Relatório do Anno de 1872 Apresentados à Assembléia Geral Legislativa na 2ª Sessão da 
15ª Legislatura (inclui Annexo) 1873. For exchange rates see www. ipeadata.gov.br.  6 
 
1895, despite the fact that British, American, Portuguese, German and Spanish 
companies had been operating in Brazil since the 1860s. 
 
Overall, from 1850 to 1889, 55 life, fire and/or maritime insurance companies were 
organized in Brazil
16. For fifteen companies it was not possible to identify which sector 
of the insurance business they were operating. However, it was possible to infer that the 
majority of firms (twenty-two) operated in maritime insurance. It is also interesting to 
note a peculiarity of the Brazilian insurance system during this period. Given the 
importance of slavery in Brazil during the Empire, some companies were operating in 
slave insurance.
17 Slaves sometimes comprised the majority of capital invested in 
agricultural undertakings, and given their risk of death or illness, it made sense for slave 
masters to insure their wealth.
18 Therefore, slave insurance was probably a mixture of life 
insurance and property insurance which ceased to exist in 1888, following the end of 
slavery in Brazil. 
 
In 1895, changes in regulation for insurance companies would be, once again, a response 
to an economic crisis.  In 1889, a peaceful revolution replaced the Empire by a 
Republican regime. The inadequacies of the banking system were deepened by the end of 
slavery in 1888 and a huge inflow of immigrants for coffee plantations. By creating a 
mass of salaried workers in the hinterland, the periodic scarcity of financial means 
became more acute. To face these difficulties the authorities sought to increase the 
capacity of the system to create money. Amidst the difficulties raised by the political 
transition to a republican regime, the money supply increased faster than planned, 
fuelling a stock mania in the Rio de Janeiro Stock Exchange. Fictitious companies were 
                                                           
16 This figure excludes branches of foreign companies as well. See Brasil (1947). 
17 Companhia de Seguros contra a Mortalidade de Escravos – Previdência (later 
Companhia Mútua de Seguros de Vida de Escravos), Companhia de Seguros de Vida de 
Escravos, Companhia Util-Previdência de Seguros contra a Mortalidade de Escravos, 
Companhia de Seguro de Vida de Escravos União Fluminense, Companhia de Seguros 
Marítimos, contra o Fogo e de Vida de Escravos Perseverança and Companhia de 
Seguros sobre a Vida de Escravos - União. 
18 Unfortunately, it was not possible to locate the archives of companies operating in 
slave insurance but newspapers may contain some clues of their operation. 
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created whose stocks eventually ended up in the issuing banks’ balances, making it very 
difficult to clean up the financial system. The Baring Brothers crash in Argentina and the 
consequent crisis in London made things worse as the influx of foreign capital stalled. 
The external crisis would in the end drive the country to a renegotiation of the Brazilian 
foreign debt in 1898 and a funding loan.
19 
 
Insurance companies did not seem to have been a direct target of this share mania: only 
16 insurance companies were organized from 1890 to 1897. However, the financial crisis 
fostered new changes in the regulatory framework. In the wake of the crisis, the 
government tightened the regulation on foreign insurance companies.  Decree 294, of 
1895, stipulated that foreign life insurance companies had to invest all their reserves in 
national assets (real estate, mortgages, shares of railroads, banks or industrial companies 
or long-term deposits in banks operating in Brazil). Moreover, charters would be granted 
only after the deposit of 200 contos de réis (US$40,500 at the 1895 exchange rate) at the 
National Treasury and these companies had to maintain their headquarters in Rio de 
Janeiro where they would be subject to supervision ‘whenever suited the Ministry of 
Finance’.
20 This tighter regulation aroused the objection of foreign insurance companies 
towards the government making the New York Insurance Co., for instance, to close 
operations in Brazil.
21 Even though it may be argued that the regulation was sparked by 
nationalistic feelings, its underlying motivation was the balance of payments crisis. These 
companies were accused of remitting all their reserves and profits to their headquarters 
abroad, deepening the external account gap. Indeed, the poor data available back the 
government’s claim. An analysis of foreign companies operating in Bahia in 1874 shows 
that the ‘Imperial Fire Insurance’, ‘Liverpool & London Globe Insurance Co.’ (both from 
Britain) and ‘Garantia’ (from Portugal) remitted the totality of their insurance premiums 
                                                           
19 Franco (1989), pp. 11-30. 
20 Instituto de Resseguros do Brasil (1942), pp. 35-43. 
21 Póvoas (2000), pp. 165-166. Actually, the company did not leave Brazil. It only ceased 
to contract new insurance policies as the company had to manage its portfolio until the 
last policy expired. As shown later here, the company in the end resumed operations. 8 
 
and profits to their headquarters. In contrast, the ‘Royal Insurance Company’ of 
Liverpool deposited all their funds in the ‘New London and Brazilian Bank Ltd.’.
 22  
 
Overall this new legislation achieved mixed results. On the one hand, it stipulated a 
reserve fund of 200 contos to protect insureds and created a supervisory role for the 
Ministry of Finance. On the other hand, the reserve fund was the same regardless of the 
size of operations, thereby generating a higher burden on smaller insurance businesses. 
Moreover, foreign life insurance companies had henceforth to invest the totality of their 
reserves in an extremely underdeveloped market which was about to suffer its biggest 
financial crisis yet. This stipulation created a contagion channel from the stock market to 
the balance sheets of insurance companies. Therefore, even though insurance companies 
were not targeted by stock market speculation, they suffered from the crisis. As soon as 
the financial crisis hit, it became clear that a new regulatory framework was needed. 
 
2. Murtinho and beyond: 1901-1939 
 
Joaquim Murtinho was an extremely influential Minister of Finance in 1898-1902 who 
successfully implemented a stabilisation programme that reversed the sharp devaluation 
of the exchange rate and recovered Brazilian credit abroad after successfully servicing the 
the first Brazilian Funding Loan and meeting its quite stiff fiscal conditionalities. He was 
also responsible for the first comprehensive piece of legislation regulating the activities 
of insurance companies in Brazil.
23  
 
The main object of the new legislation was the creation of the General Superintendence 
of Insurance Companies (Superintendência Geral de Seguros). Under the auspices of the 
Ministry of Finance, the Superintendence was further divided into two branches: 
Superintendence of Maritime and Non-Maritime Insurance (Superintendência de Seguros 
Marítimos e Terrestres) and Superintendence of Life Insurance (Superintendência de 
                                                           
22 Brasil. Bahia. Falla com que o Exmo. Sr. Commendador Antonio Candido da Cruz 
Machado abriu a 1ª Sessão da Vigésima Legislatura da Assembléia Legislativa Provincial 
da Bahia no dia 1º de Março de 1874, Salvador, pp. 214-222. 
23 Decree 4270 of 10 December 1901. 9 
 
Seguros de Vida). These two branches evinced the formal separation instituted by the 
legislation: no company could henceforth operate in both branches of insurance business. 
 
The Superintendences were located in the Federal Capital, Rio de Janeiro, and were 
responsible for supervising insurance companies operating in the Brazilian market and 
for advising the Ministry on issuance of charters (cartas-patente). All insurance 
companies had to apply for a charter to be able to operate in Brazil. This new 
bureaucracy would be funded by a contribution paid by the insurance companies but 
managed by the government. Like in the 1895 legislation, companies were also asked to 
deposit 200 contos to guarantee some minimum compensation from possible losses due 
to bad risk management. In this regard, Murtinho’s Framework went actually beyond the 
1895 decree: it also limited the value of the insurance business as it could not be higher 
than 20% of the issued capital of the company.
24 
 
The new legislation was a direct response to the 1890s financial crisis. On the one hand, 
Murtinho’s Framework tried to make the insurance market safer by creating a ceiling to 
the issue of policies, by instituting a supervisory body, and by ensuring that capital would 
not be drained to other financial markets. On the other hand, the new legislation increased 
the weakness of the insurance market as the domestic financial market was not yet 
developed enough to absorb all funds from insurance companies. Although it was not 
explicitly stated in Murtinho’s Framework, insurance companies seemed to have been 
prevented from re-insurance activities, perhaps as a way of retaining their funds in Brazil 
too.
25 This requirement made more difficult to dilute risks. Moreover, the legislation was 
perceived as very xenophobic by discriminating against foreign companies and by 
forcing them to abide by national laws. 
 
Indeed, the issuance of Decree 4.270 was followed by a struggle between Murtinho and 
the foreign insurance companies. In the annual report of the Ministry of Finance for 1901, 
                                                           
24 Instituto de Resseguros do Brasil (1942), pp. 44-84. 
25 Between 1895 and 1901, several companies changed their statutes to include a clause 
that forbade them to reinsure any assets. See Brasil. Ministério da Fazenda. Relatório, for 
these years. 10 
 
he stated that out of 18 Brazilian insurance companies registered in the Federal Capital, 
15 abode by the new rules, 2 companies entered liquidation (‘Atalaya’ and ‘Bonança’), 
and one refused to accept it (‘Equitativa’). In the states, another 19 companies abode by 
the new legislation: 7 companies in Pará, 4 in Pernambuco, 3 in Maranhão, 2 in Bahia, 2 
in Rio Grande do Sul and 1 in Ceará. Among foreign companies, no one accepted the 
new legislation and thus were all forbidden to carry out any new business in the country. 
These companies were not liquidated, as they were still allowed to manage their existing 
portfolios until the expiration of their last insurance contract, when they would then be 




Murtinho argued that foreign companies were characterized by an “impenetrable secret 
about their processes, reserves and capital”. All foreign companies but one were accused 
of tax evasion and unlawful remittance of funds. Furthermore, Murtinho mentioned that 
foreign companies would not be missed: without them, there should be more businesses 




In fact, Murtinho’s framework was not dissimilar with what was happening elsewhere in 
South America. According to the Post Magazine and Insurance Monitor, “throughout 
South America, there is a crusade against foreign capital in insurance, and the result is 
most detrimental to all concerned”.
28 However, insurance companies – with the foreign 
firms in the van -- successfully pressured congress. At the end Murtinho’s Framework 
was dropped and new legislation introduced after Murtinho left the Ministry of Finance.
29 
Indeed, there was a consequential increase in total capital issued by Brazilian insurance 
                                                           
26 Brasil. Ministério da Fazenda. Ministro Joaquim Murtinho. Relatório do Ano de 1901 
Apresentado ao Presidente da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil no ano de 1902. 
Inclui Anexo, pp. 279-304. 
27 Brasil. Ministério da Fazenda. Ministro Joaquim Murtinho. Relatório do Ano de 1901 
Apresentado ao Presidente da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil no ano de 1902. 
Inclui Anexo, pp. 279-304.  
28 Post Magazine and Insurance Monitor 17,  January 1889, p.13. 
29 Decree 5072 of 12 December 1903. 11 
 
companies. From 1901 to 1902, while all foreign companies were exiting the market, 
Brazilian companies increased their issued capital in 4.6 thousand contos, from 13.3 
thousand contos to 17.9 thousand contos.
30 
 
The new decree was a compromise between Murtinho’s Framework and the stance of 
foreign insurance companies. Even though all existing companies would henceforth have  
abide by the laws of the time they were established, the government maintained a 
supervisory role over the companies. However, the Superintendences were replaced by an 
Inspectorate of Insurance (Inspetoria de Seguros). The inspectors were still paid by the 
insurance companies as the financial independence of the supervisory body would only 
be guaranteed in 1911.
31 Other features of Murtinho’s framework were maintained as 
well: the deposit of 200 contos at the National Treasury and the ceiling for any insurance 
value, now at 40% of the companies’ issued capital. Furthermore, the new legislation 
opened room for re-insurance and instituted more clearly the amount of reserves that had 
to be retained in Brazil: 20% for Maritime and Non-Maritime insurance companies and 
100% for Life insurance companies. The decree stated that all companies were equal 
under Brazilian law, removing xenophobic elements of Murtinho’s Framework. 
 
Murtinho’s successor, Leopoldo de Bulhões, made clear that the government was aware 
of how insurance companies were being regulated in other countries. He argued that there 
were two different types of insurance market organisation. The one of the Germanic type, 
adopted by Germany and also by Sweden, Norway, Switzerland and Austria, which was 
characterized by government’s monopoly of insurance. He saw this model as inefficient 
following the rationale provided by Albert Chaufton.
32 He argued in favor of the free 
market as adopted by all other “civilized” places: England, France, United States, Chile, 
                                                           
30 Brasil. Ministério da Fazenda. Ministro Leopoldo Bulhões. Relatório do Ano de 1902 
Apresentado ao Presidente da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil no ano de 1903. 
Inclui Anexo, Quadro n. 3. 
31 Decree 9287 of 30 December 1911. Instituto de Resseguros do Brasil (1942), pp. 85-
104 and Póvoas (2000), pp. 168-170 
32 Chaufton (1884).  12 
 
Argentina, and Mexico, stressing though that in all these markets, free market was only 
possible with government regulation.
33 
 
As a result of this new legislation, foreign companies resumed operations in Brazil. In 
1908, the Inspectorate of Insurance sent a comprehensive questionnaire to insurance 
companies operating in Brazil, providing a glance of how fast the market developed in 
only 6 years. In ‘maritime and non-maritime insurance’, there were 45 companies 
operating, of which 34 were Brazilian and 11 foreign-owned. Brazilian companies 
received premiums amounting to 12.5 thousand contos (approximately US$3,850,000) 
compared to 3.3 thousand contos (approx. US$1,015,000) for foreign-owned companies, 
a market share of 20.1%. The total issued capital of Brazilian companies reached 17.2 
thousand contos (approx. US$5,300,000) whilst foreign insurance companies had issued 
only 528 contos (approx. US$160,000). There is no information regarding payment of 
dividends by foreign insurance companies, but Brazilian companies paid 1.4 thousand 
contos in dividends in 1908 (approx. US$430,000).
34 
 
In ‘Life insurance’ business, there were 8 companies operating: 7 Brazilian companies 
and one foreign-owned (New York Life Insurance Co.).
35 Altogether, these companies 
closed contracts amounting to 69.2 thousand contos (approx. US$21,300,000), with 2.8 
thousand  contos (approx. US$860,000) came from NY Life Insurance Co. (NYLIC). 
Brazilian companies retained 41.7 thousand contos (approx. US$12,800,000) as reserves 
whereas NYLIC retained 1.8 thousand conto (approx. US$550,000). The Brazilian 
companies premium revenue was 15 thousand contos (approx. US$4,600,000) and paid 
claims amounting to 4.7 thousand contos (approx. US$1,450,000) in premiums, whilst 
the NYLIC earned 1.9 thousand contos (approx. US$585,000) and paid 163 contos of 
                                                           
33 Brasil. Ministério da Fazenda. Ministro Leopoldo de Bulhões. Relatório do Ano 1902 
Apresentado ao Presidente da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil em 1903. Inclui 
Anexos, pp. 99-103. 
34 Brasil. Ministério da Fazenda. Ministro Leopoldo de Bulhões. Relatório do Ano de 
1909 Apresentado ao Presidente da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil no Ano de 
1910. Inclui Anexo, pp. 318-327. 
35 We are excluding here companies that offered retirement benefits. 13 
 
claims (approx. £50,000).
36 The market overall market share of foreign insurance 
companies was thus of 8.6% and their average size smaller than that of the Brazilian 
firms. 
 
During the First World War, two major events had an impact on the Brazilian insurance 
market. First, in 1916, the government promulgated the new Civil Code with a whole 
chapter devoted to insurance. It encompassed all branches of insurance, namely, 
‘maritime and non-maritime insurance’, ‘life insurance’ and ‘mutual insurance’ and 
represented a clear improvement over the 1850 commercial code that was restricted to 
maritime insurance only.
37 Secondly, as a result of Brazilian entry into the war on the 
Allies side, the government established a permanent supervision over German insurance 
companies. The following companies were under strict government supervision: 
‘Manheimer’, ‘Preussische National’, ‘Nord Deutsch’, ‘Achener und Muenchener Feuer’, 
‘Albingia’ and ‘Hansa Algemeine’.




In 1918, there were 57 companies operating in maritime and non-maritime insurance and 
31 companies in life insurance business. The former group premiums totaled 42.6 
thousand  contos (approx. US$11,000,000) of which 11.6 thousand contos  (approx. 
US$3,000,000) came from 18 foreign-owned companies and the remainder from 13 
Brazilian insurance companies. In the life insurance business, there was only one foreign 
company operating (NYLIC) whose total premiums in 1918 of 2.1 thousand contos 
(approx. US$540,000). The rest of the market was shared by 30 Brazilian life insurance 
companies whose total premiums amounted to 22.2 thousand contos (approx. 
                                                           
36 Brasil. Ministério da Fazenda. Ministro Leopoldo de Bulhões. Relatório do Ano de 
1909 Apresentado ao Presidente da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil no Ano de 
1910. Inclui Anexo. pp. 318-327. 
37 Instituto de Resseguros do Brasil (1942), pp. 105-111. 
38 Decree 12470 of 13 November 1917. 
39 Decree 13712 of 7 August 1919. Instituto de Resseguros do Brasil (1942), pp. 119-121. 14 
 
US$5,700,000).




In 1919, a major shift occurred in the Brazilian insurance market, with the advent of work 
accident insurance. Employers’ judicial responsibility for work accidents was legally 
defined.
41 This law culminated a persistent effort by legislators to create some sort of 
protection for urban workers.
42 New legislation also defined the type of insurance 
policies to be offered by insurance companies: ‘death’, ‘total or permanent handicap’, and 
‘total or permanent handicap for work’.
43 The decree also stipulated compensations for 
‘death’ and ‘total or permanent handicap’ as equal to the sum of three years of the 
employees’ wages. New opportunities were created for insurance business.
44 
 
In 1920, the government issued another important piece of legislation: it finally instituted 
equality between foreign and domestic insurance companies under the law, abolishing the 
privileges granted to companies that had been founded before Murtinho’s Framework.
 45 
It also brought about a tighter control of the government over the insurance market.
46 
 
It is interesting to note that in 1922, the ministry of finance published the total issued 
capital of insurance companies in Brazil amounted to 50.8 thousand contos  (approx. 
US$6,800,000). From this figure it is possible to infer what the government called ‘total 
market capacity of insurance’, established by the limit of 40% over capital. According to 
this limit, the total capacity of insurance of Brazilian companies was 13.3 thousand 
                                                           
40 Brasil. Ministério da Fazenda. Relatório Apresentado ao Vice-Presidente da República 
dos Estados Unidos do Brasil em exercício pelo ministro dos negócios da Fazenda, João 
Ribeiro de Oliveira e Souza no Anno de 1919, pp. 284-301. 
41 Law 3.724 of 15 January 1919. 
42 Before the promulgation of the law, two other projects had been presented, in 1908 and 
1915, but the issue remained unregulated until 1919. 
43 Decree 13498 of March 1919. 
44 Póvoas (2000), pp. 170-176. 
45 Decree 14595 of 31 December 1920.  
46 Póvoas (2000), p. 176. 15 
 




In 1925, insurance companies with a premium revenue of 146.3 thousand contos (approx. 
US$18,100,000) of which 95.7 thousand contos (approx. US$12,000,000) was generated 
from ‘maritime and non-maritime insurance’ and 50.6 thousand contos  (approx. 
US$6,300,000) from life insurance. In total, there were 18 Brazilian companies operating 
in life insurance with 47.4 thousand contos (approx. £1,200,000) in revenues and one 
single foreign-owned (NYLIC) with a revenue of 3.2 thousand contos  (approx. 
US$400,000). In ‘maritime and non-maritime insurance’, there were 45 Brazilian 
companies with a total revenue of 65 thousand contos (approx. US$8,000,000) and 29 
foreign companies that with a revenue of 30.7 thousand contos (approx. US$3,800,000).
48 
The overall market share of foreign companies remained practically stable at 23.2% if 
compared to the share in 1918 but for non-life insurance it reached 32%. See Table below 
for a breakdown of premiums paid by insurance companies operating in Brazil by their 
place of registration in 1925. 
                                                           
47 Brasil. Ministério da Fazenda. Relatório Apresentado ao Presidente da República dos 
Estados Unidos do Brasil pelo ministro dos negócios da Fazenda R. A. Sampaio Vidal no 
ano de 1923, pp. 215-217. 
48 Among the foreign companies thirteen were of British origin (‘Alliance Assurance’, 
‘Commercial Union’, ‘Guardian’, ‘Liverpool and London’, ‘London Assurance’, 
‘London and Lancashire’, ‘Motor Union’, ‘North British’, ‘Northern’, ‘Royal Exchange’, 
and ‘Royal Insurance’), six were Germans (‘Aachener und Munchener’, ‘Albingia’, 
‘Hansa’, ‘Mannheimer’, ‘Nord Deutsche’ and ‘Preussische’), three were from the USA 
(‘Great American’, ‘The Home’ and ‘Niagara Fire’), two from France (‘Assurance 
Générales’ and ‘L’Union’), Portugal (‘Adamastor’ and ‘Sagres’) and Argentina (‘El 
Fenix’ and ‘Instituto Italo-Argentino’) and one from Italy (‘Assicurazioni Generali’). It is 
important to highlight that the two Argentine companies operating in Brazil sold 
premiums that totaled 600 contos (approximately US$74,000) in 1925. See Brasil. 
Ministerio da Fazenda. Ministro Anibal Freire da Fonseca. Relatório do Ano de 1925 
Apresentado ao Presidente da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil no Anno de 1926.  16 
 
Premiums paid by Insurance Companies operating in Brazil by Place of 
Registration, 1925 
Brazilian Companies N. of Companies Premiums
Rio de Janeiro City, Federal District 22 33,167,591                  
Pará 3 956,049                        
Maranhão 1 94,966                          
Pernambuco 3 1,535,910                    
Bahia 2 15,781,129                  
State of Rio de Janeiro 1 71,921                          
São Paulo 7 10,099,034                  
Rio Grande do Sul 6 3,271,278                    
Foreign Companies N. of Companies Premiums
Germany 6 3,589,777                    
Argentina 2 600,800                        
United States 3 2,816,580                    
France 2 849,681                        
Britain 13 21,731,237                  
Italy 1 432,293                        
Portugal 2 691,660                        
Brazilian Companies N. of Companies Premiums
Rio de Janeiro City, Federal District 5 39,197,228                  
Maranhão 1 18,362                          
Pernambuco 1 14,580                          
State of Rio de Janeiro 1 794,815                        
São Paulo 9 4,652,718                    
Rio Grande do Sul 1 2,755,337                    
Foreign Companies N. of Companies Premiums
United States 1 3,155,285                    
N. of Companies Premiums
Maritime Insurance 74                             95,689,906                 
Life Insurance 19                             50,588,326                 
Brazilian Companies 63                             112,410,918               





Source: Brasil. Ministerio da Fazenda. Ministro Anibal Freire da Fonseca. Relatório do Ano de 1925 




In the first four decades of the republican regime Brazil had developed quite substantially 
if not spectacularly. The economy was initially dependent on coffee production and 
exports. For this dependence the country paid dearly as evidenced by repeated crisis in 
the world markets and its repercussions for the country. However, market dominance in 
the world coffee market also allowed the country to control prices through stockpiling at 
least in certain periods.
 Significant industrialisation did occur after the 1890s, mostly as a 




It is important to note that there is very little evidence that crop insurance ever developed 
in Brazil during this period, despite this over-reliance on coffee. Graham (1972, p. 91) 
says that “[t]he Royal Insurance Company emphasized that it insured coffee and even the 
plantations themselves, presumably against fire” but not much additional information 
could be found on these transactions. Coffee prices were indeed very volatile due to the 
characteristics of the crop and weather conditions. Insurance remained mostly confined to 
the coffee trade business, especially maritime insurance.
50 That is why maritime 
insurance came to dominate the insurance business until much later. Valorization policies 
may have had insurance on coffee stocks held but we were unable to find such 
transactions
51. Even a publication like Graham (1972) only makes general statements 
about insurance in coffee. Mário Pinto Serva, in turn, describes in detail the cost of 
production of coffee in Brazil and he makes no mention to insurance.
52 
 
The great depression of 1929-1932 had lasting effects on Brazil. Recovery of the level of 
activity was much swifter than in the developed economies but some of the policies 
                                                           
49 Dean (1976). 
50 According to Graham (1972, p.91), “the ships that carried coffee and brought in British 
goods were generally insured in London, frequently by Lloyd’s. Shippers could also buy 
insurance in Rio de Janeiro from British companies such as the Marine Insurance 
Company, Ltd. or the Home and Colonial Marine Insurance Company, Ltd.” 
51 In the first valorization scheme, stocks were mostly held in New York and Antwerp 
and it is possible that insurance was contracted in the USA and Belgium. In the 
subsequent valorization schemes, stocks were held in Brazil but usually hidden from the 
market to prevent prices to drop. 
52 Departamento Nacional do Café (1934). 18 
 
adopted to counter the consequences of the 1929 crash remained in place for over sixty 
years. Foreign loans to Brazil were sharply reduced in mid-1928, following the monetary 
squeeze adopted by the Federal Reserve in the United States, and ceased entirely in 1930. 
Brazilian exports collapsed as coffee prices fell to a third of their peak in the late 1920s 
as world income contracted and “coffee valorisation” policies – which depended on 
access to foreign loans to finance accumulation of stocks – were curtailed. 
 
After the collapse of the gold exchange standard, concern with the impact of foreign 
exchange devaluation on public accounts and coffee prices – since Brazil supplied two 
thirds of the world demand and devaluation induced sales of stocks to realize profits – led 
to government intervention in the foreign exchange market setting an “official” 
overvalued exchange rate. The need of rationing access to cheap foreign exchange led to 
a comprehensive foreign exchange control. Discretionary and non-transparent allocation 
criteria favored “essential” uses of foreign exchange and frequently led to difficulties 
affecting less pressing commitments such as profit remittances. Different forms of 
intervention in the foreign exchange markets would persist, with only short interruptions, 
well into the 1990s.   
 
In the wake of the great depression there was a rise of nationalist policies favoring 
autarchy and an increasing role of the state both in a normative role and as a producer of 
goods and services. Amidst mounting nationalism, as expressed in the constitutions of 
1934 and 1937, and also in specific legislation, there were proposals to nationalize 
foreign insurance companies and foreign banks operating in Brazil. The 1934 constitution 
explicitly included a provision on the nationalisation of foreign insurance companies 
(article 117). In 1937, after the coup d’état, the new constitution stipulated that mining 
concerns, mineral and water resources as well as essential industries would be 
progressively nationalized (article 144). Shareholders of banks and insurance companies 
should be Brazilian citizens and concerns already authorized to operate in the country 
would be given a period to adjust to changes in the legislation.  
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Exceptions were granted in a piece meal basis to foreign bank and insurance companies 
but the nationalist wave resulted in the creation of the Instituto de Resseguros do Brasil 
(IRB), a state-owned institution which for more than half a century had a monopoly on 
reinsurance business in Brazil and full regulatory control of the insurance business. 
 
3. Reinsurance state monopoly, fast economic growth and accelerating inflation: 
1939-1964  
 
The avowed objective of government intervention in the insurance market was to limit 
more effectively the adverse balance of payments impact of seeking reinsurance abroad. 
IRB (Decree Law 1186 of 3.4.39) was given the monopoly of reinsurance business in 
Brazil, the task of redistributing business which exceeded its retention limits to insurance 
companies operating and Brazil and the monopoly of the placement of reinsurance 
abroad. Reinsurance with IRB of risks exceeding retention limits was made compulsory 
and retention tables had to be approved by the Departamento Nacional de Seguros 
Privados e Capitalização-DNSPC. State-controlled social security institutes held 70% of 
IRB´s capital and the residual 30% were held by the insurance companies.
53 It was 
decided not to place IRB under DNSPC’s supervision since it was a state-controlled 
institution. 
 
Much new regulatory legislation was passed in the early 1940s after the creation of IRB 
such as those making compulsory to reinsure with IRB at least 20% of coinsurance 
business, establishing minimum limits for the transfer of fire coinsurance from foreign 
companies to Brazilian companies.  
 
New business opportunities were created during the war and the premium-GDP ratio 
increased from 0.44% in 1939 to 0.77% in 1945 and remained at this level in 1950s and 
early 1960s. Rough estimates for the post-World War I period indicate than the premium-
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GDP ratio was around 0.5%.
54 The number of insurance firms increased by about half in 
the 1940s (from 105 in 1939 to 151) and then reached 193 in the early 1960s. Thus, the 
average size of the firm did not increase much during the war and actually decreased until 
the early 1960s. The number of foreign firms actually decreased from 33 in 1939 to 25 in 
1945 recovering to 35 in the early 1960s.
55.It was the number of Brazilian firms which 
more than doubled between 1939 and 1963 (from 73 to 158). The stock of foreign direct 
capital of insurance firms registered with the Superintendência da Moeda e do Crédito-
SUMOC – a predecessor of the Central Bank of Brazil
56, was negligible: in the late 1940s 
it was perhaps US$ 2.4 million and in 1963 still only US$ 5 million. The net outflow 
related to insurance business floated from the mid-1940s to the mid-1960s around US$ 8-
11 million, roughly 0.7% of stagnated exports.  
 
Premiums in 1939 were concentrated in fire insurance (28.1% of the total), life (38%) and 
work accidents (19.2%).
57 During the war there was an increase in transportation 
insurance to the detriment of life insurance but this was reversed in the late 1940s. As 
inflation accelerated life insurance lost market share. Auto-related insurance grew 
steadily in response to the increased stock of motor cars and after the 1960s due to new 
legislation making it compulsory. In 1963, more than a quarter of premiums were related 
to work accident insurance, followed by fire (24%), life (13.2%) and auto (10.2%).
58  
 
After 1942 the economy entered a period of high growth (approaching 7% yearly with a 
population growth of 3% yearly) which was to last for twenty years. Inflation accelerated 
                                                           
54 GDP-premium ratios remained stable in spite of rapid GDP growth, population growth 
and urbanisation. GDP increased at the rate of 6.5% between 1930 and 1980 while GDP 
per capita increased at 3.7% yearly. Data that are not strictly comparable indicate that the 
share of the population in cities with population of 20,000 and more that had increased 
slowly in the two decades after 1920 to reach 16 percent in 1940 rose very rapidly after 
wards to reach 51.5 percent in 1980. See Abreu (2008a). 
55 The criteria adopted to justify the classification of an insurance company as foreign 
were not made public. 
56 The Central Bank of Brazil was created in 1964. 
57 In 1938, the share of foreign insurance companies in life insurance premiums was 
about 14% and in non-life insurance premiums about 48%. See Falcão (1941), pp. 44-59. 
58Data from Anuário Estatístico do Brasil, several years. 
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in the final years of the war to reach 20% yearly and, after a reduction in the immediate 
post-war, became chronic in the 1950s accelerating continuously to reach more than 90% 
yearly in 1963. A structural imbalance of public accounts was at the root of this process: 
government finance through the printing press is not a figure of expression as persistently 
high inflation combined with an usury law that limited nominal interest rates to 12% a 
year made it impossible to finance public deficits by issuing debt. Balance of payments 
constraints were also significant as the structural change in GDP favouring 
manufacturing had no parallel in export diversification: Brazil in the first half of the 
1960s was still essentially an exporter of agricultural commodities with coffee at the top 
of the list. The cyclical fall of coffee prices combined with accelerated growth in the 
second half of the 1950s led to balance of payments difficulties and negotiated 
rescheduling of foreign debt service payments in 1961-1962.  
 
Government resort to compulsory saving specifically affected insurance companies. In 
1953, for instance, the newly created Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Econômico 
was partially funded by transfers drawn from a share of the increase in technical reserves 
of social insurance institutos, saving societies (caixas econômicas) and insurance and 
capitalisation companies. Regulation of limits to insurance acceptances based on assets 
tended to be rather restrictive on foreign companies. 
 
In spite of adverse circumstances linked with chronic and accelerating high inflation there 
was no contraction of the insurance business as shown by the premium-GDP ratio 
between the end of World War II and 1962 as the economy expanded at the rate of 7.4% 
yearly.  
 
4. Stabilisation and economic “miracle”: 1964-early 1980s 
  
The combination of high inflation and sudden collapse in the level of economic activity 
in a context of increasing political instability in 1962-63 was an important element to 
explain the military coup of 1964. The new military regime – which was to last for more 
than 20 years – had an ambitious program of economic reform. First and foremost there 22 
 
was an emphasis on reduction of chronic inflation which was made possible by an 
overhaul of public finance. Expenditures were cut, fiscal reform was introduced and, 
perhaps most important of all, the legal institution of a segmentation of the nominal 
interest rate into “monetary correction” and a real element made feasible the flotation of 
public debt denominated in domestic currency. There was a major overhaul of legislation 
concerning economic issues which affected themes as diverse as social security, job 
stability, funding for the housing sector, simplification of the foreign exchange regime, 
reduction of the anti-export bias and a less restrictive treatment of foreign direct 
investment. But on the whole one might say that there was a sustained emphasis on 
essential features that were present before 1964: a rather closed economy and massive 
state presence in the provision of goods and services.  
 
There were new institutional arrangements involving insurance business in 1966 but there 
was no major break with the past. The main policy objective was still “to avoid the drain 
of foreign exchange”. The basic legal framework within which insurance activities take 
place in Brazil was established.
59 . The Decree-Law created the Private Insurance 
National System (SNSP) comprising the National Private Insurance Council (CNSP), the 
Brazilian Re-insurance Institute (IRB), the Private Insurance Superintendence (SUSEP) 
as well as the insurance companies and insurance brokers. 
 
The CNSP's responsibilities included defining policies for private insurance and 
reinsurance as well as regulating the establishment, organisation, operation and 
supervision of entities undertaking activities within the SNSP. SUSEP was charged with 
implementing the policies defined by the CNSP, supervising firms operating within the 
SNSP, processing applications to operate or liquidate insurance companies and approving 
contracts coverage and premiums. The IRB´s competence included acceptance of 
mandatory or optional re-insurance both in Brazil and abroad. Insurance companies had 
to re-insure with the Institute liabilities exceeding their retention limits. The IRB was also 
responsible for placing overseas insurance and re-insurance; re-insurance operations 
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abroad were usually restricted to the excess the domestic market could not absorb, based 
on the technical retention capacity of the Institute and retrocession consortia administered 
by the IRB whose membership was compulsory for all insurance companies operating in 
Brazil  
 
The total number of insurance firms remained roughly constant between the early 1960s 
and the early 1970s – around 190 – then fell sharply to less than 100 in the early 1980s. 
Of the 29 foreign insurance companies operating in 1979 only 3 remained in operation in 
the early 1980s. There was a monotonic fall in the share of business by foreign 
companies indirectly reflected in the fall of their share in total assets from 35.6% in 1939 
to 16.7% in 1946 and 14% in 1963. Foreign direct investment in insurance remained 
rather small: it was still below US$ 90 million in the early 1980s. 
  
The transfer of compulsory work accident insurance to the Ministry of Labour in 1967 
makes unadjusted long-term comparisons of premium-GDP ratios somewhat misleading 
as the business corresponded to about 25% of total premiums in the early 1960s. The 
premium-GDP ratios (excluding work accident insurance) remained in the 0.9-1.0 range 
with GDP increasing 7.8% yearly in 1964-1980. More recently the National Social 
Security Institute (INSS), hierarchically linked to the Ministry of Social Security, is the 
sole authorized supplier of worker's compensation insurance.
60  
 
Insurance business in the early 1980s was heavily concentrated in the Southeast – about 
81 % of total premiums – and less comprehensive more recent data suggest that this may 
have been reduced to about two thirds of the total in 2007.
61    
 
Compulsory auto accident insurance was introduced in 1966 with a significant impact on 
the composition of total premiums. Excluding work accident insurance from the total of 
                                                           
60 WTO (2005), pp. 151-153.  
61 Anuário Estatístico do Brasil 1983, p.792 and http://www.fenaseg.org.br. The share of 




premiums, between 1963 and 1970 the share of auto insurance more than doubled to 
32.4% while fire insurance fell to 23.9% (from 32.%) and life insurance remained around 
18%. If overall insurance business in Latin America is compared to that in East Asia a 
striking feature until 1990 was the much lower share of life business as compared to non-
life (typically hovering around 25% of total business as compared to 75%). 
62 
 
The persistently negative insurance account in the balance of payments (outflow of 
around US$ 10 million yearly from 1947 to the mid-1970s) lent strength to a major shift 
of policy in the IRB in the direction of seeking reinsurance business abroad. Amidst 
statements stressing the “impotence of liberal capitalism” there was a move towards an 
increase in the international reinsurance operations of IRB.
63 An IRB office was opened 
in London and business in New York was conducted by the United Americas Insurance 
Co, ultimately controlled by IRB. A sharp rise in IRB revenues and a temporary reversal 
of outflows related to insurance (average net inflows US$120 million yearly) followed, 
but the whole process would be reversed and lead to severe losses after the early 1980s. 
 
There was also a sustained increase in IRB´s share to around 40% of the total reinsurance 
business in the 1970s and 1980s (total premiums of US$3.2 and 4.3 billion, respectively) 
as compared to less than 12% in the 1960s (total premiums of US$353 million). 
Domestically-placed retrocession fell from 70.4% to 40% of the total reinsurance while 
the share of those placed abroad remained around 16-17%.
64  
 
5. Economic stagnation and very high inflation: 1980-1993 
 
With the oil shock of 1979 and the rise in international interest rates there was an 
acceleration of inflation, after a succession of failed stabilisation plans, from 40% a year 
to more than 80% monthly in the early 1990s. This stimulated increasing doubts about 
the costs and benefits of insisting on an economic strategy based on high protection and a 
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Sigma, Swiss/Re 6/92.  
63 International Insurance Monitor, November 1977. 
64 See Leopoldi (1998), table 7, quoting Consultec/Fenaseg. 25 
 
dominant role of the state as had been the case since the 1930s. In this macroeconomic 
context, after a truly outstanding growth performance until the 1970s – in the same 
league as Japan and South Korea since 1900 – the Brazilian economy stagnated in the 
1980s and then grew very slowly until the early 2000s.  
 
Between 1980 and 1993, GDP average yearly growth fell to 1.6% and yearly average 
inflation rose to 426% (GDP deflator, yearly peak nearly 2600% in 1990). Foreign direct 
investment in insurance increased slowly in 1980-1993 roughly doubling from US$ 80 to 
US$ 160 million while total FDI trebled in same period. This was in spite of the stimuli 
to the inflow of new foreign capital in the insurance sector after 1986 with new rules 
allowing foreign participation in the capital of insurance firms provided this was limited 
to half the total capital and one third of the voting capital.. 
 
The number of insurance firms between the early 1980s and the early 1990s remained 
roughly stable with the number of insurance firms with foreign participation (foreign 
share in equity above 50%) increasing significantly.
65 In 1990 international sources 
reported 105 companies. The 18 foreign companies answered for 13.8% of total 
premiums.
66 But foreign direct investment registered in the Brazilian Central Bank in 
1995 was still at US$150 million (less than 0.45% of total FDI stock) 
  
The premium-GDP ratio increased very slowly to reach 1.3% in the early 1990s. In the 
early 1990s, when high inflation was nearing its end, more than 72% of insurance 
premiums were concentrated in four branches: auto (34.9%), health (17.4%) – which had 
become available in the Brazilian market in the mid-1970s – life (11.3%) and fire (9.1%).  
 
Price indexation rules were crucial to determine profitability of insurance companies due 
to asymmetrical indexation of revenues and expenditures. Only in 1987 did SUSEP 
                                                           
65 Based on the assumption that IBGE data and Sigma data are comparable. The IBGE 
official series on the number of companies was discontinued in the 1980s.  
66 “East Asia and Latin America-the Most Dynamic Insurance Market of the Nineties?”. 
Sigma, Economic Studies 6/92. 26 
 
succeed in making compulsory for insurance companies to use monetary correction to 
adjust claim payments.  
 
In the insurance industry the period after the early 1980s was dominated by IRB´s crisis.   
In spite of statements in the mid-1980s that gross IRB profits were sufficient to cover 
losses generated by the London office, pay dividends and capitalize the institution, no 
less than two thirds of income from assets in 1983-84 was being eaten up by negative 
operational results. The London office was put in run off and UAIC went out of business 
after severe losses. In the mid-1990s IRB was still making yearly provisions concerning 
losses in UAIC in New York (US$24 million) as well as in the London office (US$230 
million).  
 
In addition to these losses in London and New York IRB suffered massive losses in its 
business related to export credit insurance. In February 2000, amidst the aborted process 
of privatizing IRB, there was a settlement by the Federal government of almost US$900 
million owed by Seguro de Crédito à Exportação (SCE), operated by IRB, to Finex 
(Fundo de Financiamento à Exportação), an extinct fund operated by the Bank of 
Brazil.
67 The positive net balance of payments inflow of the late 1970s was reversed: in 
1980-1985 it averaged US$42 million yearly, US$77 million in the second half of the 
1980s, decreasing to US$52 million in 1992-1993.  
 
Under the 1988 Constitution, foreign access to Brazil's insurance market was relatively 
restricted. The incorporation of new branches and subsidiaries of foreign insurance 
companies, as well as increases in the percentage of the participation of foreign persons 
and firms in the capital stock of Brazilian insurance institutions with headquarters in 
                                                           
67 There were other losses as the US$ 98 million deposited in the bankrupt Banco 
Econômico branch in the Cayman Islands. In 1997 the Brazilian government established 
an export credit guarantee fund and put in place an export credit insurance system on an 
entirely new basis. An Export Credit Insurance scheme overhauled the export insurance 
business which remains rather small: the Brazilian Export Credit Insurance Co. is the 
most important specialized institution operating with short-, medium and long-term 
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Brazil was not permitted. Imports could only be insured with companies established in 
Brazil; exports had to be insured in Brazil when the sale included the insurance cost. 
Regulation of the financial system was to be defined by constitutional amendments.
68 
After 1990 there were signs of mild flexibilisation of regulations as, for instance, those on 
SUSEP guidelines for setting premium rates.  
 
6. Since 1993: stabilisation, stalled reform and fast expansion of insurance business  
 
From the early 1990s the model of autarchy and heavy state intervention started to be 
comprehensively revised and there was a significant reduction of protection, considerable  
deregulation and privatisation of many state-owned concerns starting with industrial 
firms and then affecting providers of public services such as telecoms and electricity. In 
1993-1994 chronic inflation was finally tamed with the implementation of the Real Plan. 
Privatisation of the financial sector proceeded at a much slower pace and the planned 
privatisation of IRB stalled after complex judicial wrangles. Much of the privatisation of 
the financial sector proceeded on an ad hoc basis and liberalisation was not bound in the 
World Trade Organisation pending parliamentary approval of new legislation. Late 
privatisation was also affected by changed circumstances related to the balance of 
payments crisis that hit the Brazilian economy in late 1998. 
69 
  
There were 122 companies in Brazilian insurance market in 1995. 70 per cent of the 
market corresponded to insurers linked to financial institutions. Market concentration was 
high with the ten largest insurance firms collecting about 64 per cent of all premiums.
70 
High inflation and defective indexation were important deterrents of the expansion of 
premium-GDP ratios especially in the case of life insurance business. Following the 
success of stabilisation in 1994, the premium-GDP ratio doubled after hovering for a long 
period slightly above 1%: it reached 2.15% in 1998. It was a ratio higher than Mexico’s, 
similar to that of Argentina, but lower than Chile´s 3.39% -- where a significant portion 
                                                           
68 WTO (1997), pp. 157-163.  
69 See www. wto.org, GATS/SC/13/Suppl.3. Levy and Pereira (2007) is a good source on 
developments of the insurance business in the 1990s and early 2000s.  
70 WTO (1997), pp. 157-163. 28 
 
of the pension system was privatized -- and much lower than the more than 10% of South 
Korea.
71 Non-life business answered for 60% of total business still in contrast to both 
Chile´s and South Korea´s share of about a third of the total. 
 
After 1996 significant mergers and acquisitions took place as foreign insurance 
companies entered the Brazilian market. The share of foreign companies in premiums 
trebled to reach 17.9% in 1997 and then doubled to 35.1% in 2002 but foreign direct 
investment in the insurance business remained around 0.5 % of the total stock according 
to the 2000 census. 
72 
 
Brazil's list of commitments under the General Agreement on Trade in Services which 
resulted from the Uruguay Round included engagements concerning the participation of 
foreign capital in insurance, re-insurance and brokerage activities pending on the 
approval of legislation by Congress which has proved to be extremely slow. 
73  
 
Procurement of insurance by the three levels of governments used to take place at set 
prices, with contracts allocated to insurers through a "lottery". Since 1993, the public 
sector has contracted insurance services through tenders opened to all insurers operating 




Legislation introduced in 1996 ended IRB´s reinsurance monopoly.
75 In 1997 IRB was 
included in the privatisation program, an official valuation was undertaken to establish a 
minimum price and legal adjustments were made to prepare its auction. IRB was renamed 
IRB Re and IRB´s indebtedness with FINEX, as already mentioned, of no less than 
US$893 million was transferred to the Federal government prior to planned privatisation. 
                                                           
71 The other striking feature of the South Korean insurance industry was the low 
participation of foreign firms, Sigma 4/2000. 
72 Data supplied by the Brazilian Central Bank. There are discrepancies between stock 
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73 WTO (1997), pp. 157-163. 
74 Law 8666. WTO (1997), pp. 157-163  
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This was controversial as it was deemed to unduly favor private insurers that held a 
minority IRB Re’s stake.
76 
 
There were two attempts to privatize IRB Re but doubts on valuation methods marked the 
whole process. In the end it was the transfer in 1999 to SUSEP of  supervision of 
reinsurance and retrocession operations previously undertaken by IRB that caused major 
problems and aborted the process. Up to 1999, SUSEP was responsible for the control 
and supervision of insurance, open private pension funds – which had been created by 
new legislation in 1997
77 -- and capitalisation operations, while IRB supervised the 
reinsurance and retrocession operations. The then main opposition party – which would 
win the presidential elections in 2002 and again in 2006 – successfully argued in the 




The 2002 presidential elections subjected Brazilian economic policy to a stiff credibility 
test. As the date of the elections approached uncertainty concerning future 
macroeconomic policy led to sharp devaluation of domestic currency.
79 The economic 
program of the main party in the coalition supporting the leading candidate was rather 
radical firmly rooted in old fashioned nationalism and state intervention. The proposals to 
default public debt are perhaps emblematic of its nature. To avoid such tensions all 
candidates subscribed an agreement that there would be no sharp reversal of prudent 
macroeconomic policies whatever the result. To the surprise of many observers the fiscal 
and monetary policies adopted under President Lula´s government to a large extent 
consolidated stabilisation achieved under President Cardoso.  
 
In December 2003, there were 130 insurance companies (of which 14 were health 
insurance companies), 15 investment plan companies, and 29 open private pension fund 
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77 Law 9477, 24.7.1997. 
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79 The exchange rate approached a peak of almost 4 Reais/US$ in 2002 compared to2.4 
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societies in operation. These numbers remained stable until mid-2008.
80 The premium-
GDP ratio rose to 2.99% with almost equivalent shares of life and non-life business.
81 




New legislation passed in 2007 provided a new framework for re-insurance business in 
Brazil, as it opened the reinsurance sector to foreign-owned and foreign-based 
companies. The operations of reinsurance and retrocession can now be held with the local 
reinsurer (established as a corporation, with the sole object of conducting operations of 
reinsurance and retrocession), with the admitted re-insurer (based abroad, with office of 
representation in Brazil, registered with SUSEP to carry out operations of reinsurance 
and retrocession); and with the foreign re-insurer (foreign reinsurance company based 
abroad without office of representation in Brazil also registered as such in SUSEP). The 
law allows Brazilian legal persons to take out insurance abroad to cover risks abroad, 
provided this is notified to the SUSEP. Prior to it cross-border supply of insurance 
services was not allowed, unless in very special circumstances. The situation of the 
Brazilian reinsurance market changed substantially as IRB-Brasil Re (successor of IRB) 
ceased to be the sole provider of re-insurance. Towards the end of 2008 there were 21 
reinsurance companies operating: three local, ten as admitted and eight as occasional.
83  
 
In the industry as a whole there was a further modest increase in the participation of 
foreign capital in the insurance industry’s premium income which rose 36.9% in 2007. In 
the open private pension funds, foreign capital participation grew from 21% in 1999 to 
30.7% in 2007. Between 2000 and 2001 foreign direct investment in insurance more than 
doubled to reach US$ 1120 million, then doubled again to reach US$ 2472 million by the 
                                                           
80 WTO (2005) and WTO (2009). 
81 59.6% for life and health insurance, 25.3% for motor vehicle insurance, and the rest for 
fire, transportation, and other risks, WTO (2009). 
82 “World insurance in 2007: emerging markets leading the way” Statistical appendix 
updated December 2008, Sigma 3/2008. 
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end of 2008 (more than 0.9% of total stock).
84 In parallel with the increasing importance 
of insurance in FDI the insurance account in the balance of payments became 
significantly negative: US$ 336 million on average in 2000-2004, US$ 520 million in 
2005-2008. 
 
The Brazilian national insurance system after the introduction of partial reforms in the 
1990s and 2000s is now composed of the National Council of Private Insurance (CNSP), 
the Superintendence of Private Insurance (SUSEP) and the reinsurers, besides private 
insurance companies and authorized brokers. The CNSP is the main body responsible for 
setting policies for the private insurance industry, including the definition of the 
characteristics of different insurance contracts, and for the regulation of the national 
insurance system. SUSEP, an autonomous body under the organisational structure of the 
Ministry of Finance, has responsibility for the control and supervision of insurance, 
reinsurance, open private pension funds, and capitalisation (investment plans) operations. 
SUSEP is the industry regulator, executes the CNSP policies and has recently introduced 
new mechanisms of risk management into the insurance, open private pension funds and 
capitalisation markets moving towards a risk-based supervisory regime consistent with 
international standards and practices, such as the International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors. Furthermore, SUSEP is encouraging the creation and development of 
popular insurance products. Supervision of the health insurance business is the 




The insurance industry in Brazil was quite concentrated in 2008: in life insurance and 
private pension funds the top 10 companies answered for 81% of total retained premiums 
sold by the 50 largest companies. Companies controlled by banks (Bradesco Vida e 
Previdência, Aliança do Brasil, Santander Seguros, HSBC Seguros and Itaú Vida) sold 
                                                           
84 See www.bcb.gov.org. Stock estimates result from the accumulation of flow data 
taking the 2000 and 2005 census estimates as initial stocks. Central Bank data may 
underestimate as the line corresponding to “ancillary activities related to financial 
intermediation” includes some investment in insurance. 
85 WTO (2009). 
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more than 50% of this total. Aliança do Brasil is controlled by Banco do Brasil, a 
commercial bank controlled by the Federal government. Other companies in the top 10 
included three independent Brazilian insurance companies (Unimed Seguros,  Icatu 
Hartford
86, Sul América Vida e Previdência) as well as two foreign companies (Mapfre 
Vera Cruz Vida e Previdencia and Metlife Seguros e Previdência).   
 
Non-life business was similarly concentrated with the market share of issued premiums 
of 81.6% of the top 10 companies in the premiums issued by the top 50. Companies 
controlled by banks (Bradesco Seguros, Porto Seguro, Unibanco Seguros e Previdência, 
Itaú Seguros e Caixa Seguros) sold almost 50% of this total. Caixa Seguros is controlled 
by Caixa Econômica Federal, a commercial bank controlled by the Federal government. 
Other companies in the top 10 included one independent Brazilian insurance company 
(Sul América) as well as four foreign companies (Mapfre Vera Cruz Seguradora, Allianz 
Seguros, Liberty Mutual and Tokio Marine).
87   
 
Due to the prudent fiscal and monetary policies adopted -- especially after 1998 -- the 
Brazilian economy, although hardly hit by the sharp fall in commodity export prices has 
proved to be resilient in face of the world economic crisis. The financial sector, 
strengthened by policies to face former crises in the late 1990s, proved to be extremely 
solid, even if compared to those in the developed economies. The results of sound 
macroeconomic policy, important new oil findings and an early recovery of economic 
activity have been attracting a significant inflow of foreign capital. Sustained high rates 
of growth seem achievable after many years of slow growth. 
 
To a large extent the expansion of the insurance industry in Brazil after the mid-1990s 
has been the result of the combination of macroeconomic and microeconomic favourable 
factors. After a long experience of unbalanced public finance and very high inflation 
sustained stabilisation was achieved. There was a partial overhaul of the regulatory 
                                                           
86 Hartford’s participation has been acquired recently by their Brazilian partners. 
87 Valor 1000, edição 2009, agosto 2009, ano 9, número 9. 33 
 
framework relevant for the insurance industry and a significant opening of the market to 
foreign competition.  
 
Two new developments are likely to have a significant impact on insurance business in 
the longer term. There have been major offshore oil discoveries in Brazil, especially since 
2008, which are likely to transform the country -- which is now self sufficient -- into a 
major oil exporter towards the end of the 2010s. The other favourable development is the 
impact of redistributive policies and improved recent growth performance on income 
distribution. The market for “popular insurance” has increased using the network of 
commercial banks, credit card companies and billing of companies providing public 
services. Legislation on “micro insurance” targeting low income groups and with an 




In a very long-term perspective, the insurance business in Brazil may be seen as marked 
by a strong shift towards more state intervention combined with regulation designed to 
crowd foreign firms out of the Brazilian market. This peaked in the late 1970s and was 
followed by a rather slow liberalisation with a reduction in regulation with a nationalistic 
bias and an increased market share of foreign firms. 
 
After an extremely low take off in the 19
th century, insurance business grew in 
importance in the virtual absence of regulation. But as a result of the major balance of 
payments in 1890s, following the transition to a republican regime, there was an early 
move towards much more control of the activities of foreign firms and the proposal of 
legislation that would effectively discriminate against them. These initiatives under 
minister Murtinho – who is generally credited with the implementation of orthodox 
economic policies – were strongly criticized and not wholly implemented.  
 
But the balance of payments difficulties related to the great 1929-1932 recession created  
conditions for the introduction -- or reintroduction -- of legislation with a bias in favour 34 
 
of direct government involvement in the business, much tighter regulation and effective 
discrimination of foreign firms in favour of domestic or government-controlled 
institutions. The Instituto de Resseguros do Brasil was emblematic of such shift in policy 
that was akin to import substitution in manufacturing industry. The nationalistic trend 
culminated in the 1970s in the attempt to enhance the international role of IRB which 
ended in utter failure. 
  
Since then, liberalisation has been slowly progressing. In spite of the aborted privatisation 
of IRB in 2000, a combination of an extensive regulatory overhaul, the expansion of new 
branches in the industry – such as private pension funds – and the end of high inflation, 
opened new opportunities for a significant expansion of the insurance business combined 
with an increased share of foreign companies. Dominant 
  insurance companies, however, continued to be controlled by the big Brazilian 
commercial banks. 
 
Although the insurance industry in Brazil still faces significant problems related to low 
efficiency and barriers to competition in an environment which is less favourable to 
liberalisation than before 2003, its prospects have never been so good in a context of low 
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